The Least of the Sentient Beings\u27 and the Question of Reduction, Refinement, and Replacement by Vining, Joseph
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications Faculty Scholarship
2003
The Least of the Sentient Beings' and the Question
of Reduction, Refinement, and Replacement
Joseph Vining
University of Michigan Law School, jvining@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/85
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Animal Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vining, Joseph. "'The Least of the Sentient Beings' and the Question of Reduction, Refinement, and Replacement." Law Quad. Notes
46, no. 2 (2003): 82-8.

I 
The follovving essay is based on the keynote address the author 
delivered at the annual meeting of the Michigan Society for Medical 
Research last April in Lansing. It appears here with permission of 
the author, (~J Joseph Vining. 
The subject I was asked to think about with you today is raised 
by a very large change in the focus of biomedical research. In 
raw percentage terms, the animals involved in experimentation 
are now overwhelmingly rats and mice, and, perhaps because they 
are rats and mice, they are used in large numbers, numbers in 
thousands and tens of thousands at some institutions. 
Legal, ethical, and practical accommodation to this fact on 
the ground presents a host of questions. There are questions of 
the cost of care. There are questions of the training of veterinar-
ians, principal investigators, and laboratory personnel. With mice 
particularly, there are questions about the creation of conditions 
in an animal that do not yet exist, a future animal, by knocking 
out a gene and, as we say, "seeing what happens": new questions, 
really, that move us away from the traditional focus on the details 
of how an investigator treats a living animal. 
Then there are the central questions of weighing costs and 
benefits, of justification and the application of the three R's of 
reduction, refinement, and replacement, where it is not dogs or 
primates or marine mammals that are concerned, but rats and 
mice - for many, the least on the scale of concern for animals. 
Rats, mice, and birds have of course been recently exempted 
from the Animal Welfare Act. But that may be viewed as making 
the questions only that much more difficult, thrown back into the 
laps of researchers themselves and review boards, veterinarians, 
laboratory assistants, and university and corporate administrators, 
who for the moment can expect to have that much less outside 
guidance or mandate in deciding what to do. And I think it is fair 
to say that lying behind particular responses to questions and reso-
lutions of issues is a newly pressing, overarching problem, which 
is how to think about rats and mice, not a new problem at all, but 
newly pressing. 
Now I speak of the "least," and my title is "The Least of the 
Sentient Beings." But I am a lawyer, and I know that in this 
audience and in general view there is something vertebrate and 
warm-blooded that is beneath rats and mice. My colleague Mark 
Gallanter at Wisconsin follows the relative popularity of lawyer 
jokes, and has reported that the most popular lawyer jokes are lab 
rat jokes, such as, Why have laboratories starting using lawyers 
instead of rats in experiments? One: There are more of them. 
Two: The lab assistants don't get attached to them. And three: 
There are some things a rat just won't do. 
But that opens the positive things that are said about rats and 
mice, as sentient beings in the world with us. Jokes aside, some of 
us may know of cases where a lab rat became a favorite and was 
adopted as a pet by a member of the lab. Rats are pets in class-
rooms around the country. I remember my surprise when I was 
in the waiting room at the vet's and I picked up a copy of the Rat 
and Mouse Gazette, with its departments and features, the "Medical 
Corner," the "Mouse of the Month" (named "Moo"), the articles 
on upcoming shows and rat and mouse events. You can go to the 
Web and read memorial testimonials: "Skin was my favorite rat. I 
adopted Skin in November 1998 right after my 40th birthday - a 
wonderful birthday present indeed! ... Skin was a very cuddly rat 
and loved to nestle in my arms or lay on my lap to be petted. He 
was also very playful and enjoyed wrestling with my hand." All this 
makes me think of the patron saint of Peru, and of the Dominican 
Order in the southern United States, the 16th century St. Martin de 
Porres, who doctored and healed slaves, Indians, and Viceroys and 
also established the first animal hospital. He was known for his way 
with mice, whom he could persuade to disinfest a building on his 
promise that he would feed them outside, which he did. His picture 
often has a mouse at his feet or in his hand. Indeed, a very distin-
guished biopsychologist, Barbara Smuts, came to a class of mine 
last year to talk about her work with primates and dolphins and the 
possibility of true mutual relationships betvveen human beings and 
these animals viewed as whole beings. A student asked whether she 
thought a human being could have a true relationship with a mouse. 
She finally answered, Yes, she thought that was possible. 
What then to consider, what to look at, what context to be 
aware of in thinking responsibly about the future of experimenta-
tion on these creatures? I would suggest four things to keep an eye 
on. 
• First is that developments in experimentation on humans 
parallel and are connected with developments in experimenta-
tion on animals. Animal experimentation is not isolated off and 
a field of activity unto itself. 
• Second is that there are developments in the science of 
animals beyond the biomedical field, in other subdisciplines, 
that will have an impact. Science advances on more than one 
front. 
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to th fir t, r ar hon humans, it i us ful to not th 
hi tori al w rk b ing don now pointing to an m erg nc of 
n rn about human exp rim ntation from one rn about 
animal p rim ntation , rath r than th oth r wa around . 
omparing human and animal r ar h , p opl working ith 
animals toda fr qu ntl ay that animal , unlik human cannot 
gi r withhold th ir con nt and that thi in a wa put a 
gr at r burd n on animal r ar h r . 
But official ommi ion r port ha incr a ingly r al d 
that on nt wa not mu h involv d in human xp rim ntation 
ith r, in th Unit d tat up t and aft r th cond World War. 
E n toda , th con ptual po ibility of fr and full inform d 
o nt in human xperim ntati n do not produ a r al gulf 
b t n human and animal xp rim ntation . A larg part of 
human xperim ntation till cannot be and i not ju tified b th 
on nt of th ubj t - xp rim ntation on hildr n , on th 
r tard d or th m ntall ill, in th military, on the v r poor. Th 
dil mma and d i ion nd up b ing thought about in mu h th 
a a in animal exp rim ntation, ighing co t , whi h ar 
d m d" thi al co ,"again t hop cl-for b n fit , and a king at 
what p int utilitarian thinking, ju tificati n of m an by nd , of 
uf£ ring by m to pr nt uf£ ring by many, com up against 
a ub tantiv limit wh r th r ar som thing that ar just not 
don. 
Th r i a cat g ry of xp rim ntal pro dur s that und r th 
Animal Welfar A t ar "una ptable r gardl s of anti ipat cl 
ar h in titution' xpre ion fit . Th 
of paralyti without an th ia . I 
think w may find that at s m point tru and xquisit pain or 
d p di tr that r main a part of a tr xp rim nt n a rat 
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n d d for r s ar h and t up a san tuary £ r th m wh r no 
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A large part of human experimentation still cannot be and is not justified by 
the consent of the subject - experimentation on children, on the retarded, 
the mentally ill, or prisoners, in the military, on the very poor. 
Chimpanzees are not rats and mice, but much of scientific 
work proceeds on the presupposition and even with the motiva-
tion of showing that there is no qualitative difference between 
human beings and the rest of animate nature. Biomedical science 
is judicious in selecting its systemic similarities between animal 
and human models. But the default position, which determines 
the burden of proof, is reflected in Principle #4 of the U.S. 
Government Principles: "Unless the contrary is established, inves-
tigators should consider that procedures that cause pain or distress 
in human beings may cause pain or distress in other animals." 
Going back to the first point, the parallels in human and animal 
experimentation and the relevance of one to the other, we should 
not wonder that careful scientific observation draws animals and 
human beings together. An unfolding general question is going to 
be inevitably with us, whether to treat human research subjects 
more Hke animals, or to treat animal research subjects more like 
humans - even animal research subjects we may presently rank 
lower than the primate, dog, and cat of yesteryear's research 
focus. 
THE BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
The third point, the large and general movements in the legal 
treatment of animals, I can only mention. It is wise counsel, of 
course, to stay consciously aware that vve are almost never in 
a position where "no law" applies to animal experimentation. 
In human experimentation people sometimes say tl1at this or 
that aspect remains to be regulated, and they forget tl1e back-
ground, which is the ordinary law of assault, battery, mayhem, 
and homicide including reckless and negligent homicide, that 
applies to what any individual does to any other human being. 
Similarly, the ordinary criminal laws of animal cruelty, animal 
fighting, animal neglect, and so forth, now over a century old, 
are the background to all animal experimentation. Charges have 
been brought when - we might say even when - the animal is 
a mouse. 
Cruelty to animals has been moving in the recent past from 
a misdemeanor to a felony, which is significant, and new laws 
are mandating psychiatric treatment for cruelty to animals. The 
latter, moving beyond the criminal law, has an obvious wider 
significance. We live and work within an exemption from what 
otherwise would apply, an exemption that is not always explicit; 
and wherever you find an exemption in the law, it indicates where 
the burden of justification lies. 
But the legal context is wider than these specifics, and it is 
changes in the background as a whole that I think responsible 
decision makers throughout the biomedical research community 
can helpfully take into account. Some of them are what we call 
common law developments, shifts in the way judges and juries 
think about cases. Some of them are legislative and build on main-
stream study commissions and ongoing law reform drafting at the 
state and local level. 
In tort law - the law of civil recovery for harm that is not 
criminal or contractual - measures of damages have changed 
and aninlals are already beginning to move from their traditional 
property status to quasi-property and even something sui generis in 
both the United States and Europe. 
That trend can also be seen in the law of international trade, 
where recent World Trade Organization litigation is producing 
a sense of animals as something other than the ordinary objects 
of trade and commerce and therefore exempt from a purely 
economic analysis. Even in the staid law of wills and trusts, law 
reform commissions as well as common law courts are moving to 
allow wills to be broken that require the destruction of aninlals, 
and to allow animals to be the beneficiaries of trusts where only 
human beings could be before. 
The same is to be seen in the law of divorce, which you might 
think far afield, but really is not. Disputes over animals can move 
from being disputes over property to being disputes over custody, 
and as in custodial arrangements for children, concern for the 
animal as such enters legal consideration. These disparate devel-
opments are mutually reinforcing, in that seeing an aninlal as an 
independent being comes to settle more deeply and comfortably 
in the legal mind, so that a phrase such as tl1at in the CHIMP Act, 
"the best interests" of the individual animal involved, becomes 
legally meaningful. 
But the most important changes may be constitutional, not 
giving animals "rights" but changing the way they are perceived 
and how they are weighed in cost-benefit dunking, and fixing tl1e 
values associated with them somewhat beyond the vagaries of tl1e 
legislative process. Europe's constitution, the Treaty of Rome, was 
amended six years ago to change the definition of animal from 
agricultural product or property to "sentient being" - that is 
tl1e term used - for purposes of interpreting tl1e whole range 
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ub p cialiti of biom di al r arch; th large development in 
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itiz n participant in civi li£ them lv . But I can b mor than 
ugg tiv about th importan e of att ntion to what , for ant a 
b tter word all attitud . 
Th r i th matter of attitud to ard r gulation and th 
r quirem nt of r gulation, uch a it will turn out to b wh r 
rats and mic ar on rn d . The ju t-pa t Dire tor of th F deral 
ffi e of Human Re e rch Protection , Greg Ko ki , an an the-
iologi t from th Har ard M dical chool, travel d to a r arch 
in titution about on a k , aying 'It' a great opportunity to 
g t a feel for th culture of th in titution . ' gain t skeptics ho 
argu d that a er ditation and elf-a m nt ma m rely l ad 
uni r iti to do th "minimum ne e ary" to k p th m lv s off 
th radar er n , Ko ki argu d that th will help r arch institu-
tion wit h , in hi word 'from a cultur of compliance to on of 
on ienc and r pon ibiHty." 
It is a trong and moral word, con i n e , and it a sum a 
rtain attitud toward th r ar h ubj ct . Ind cl, th attitude 
to ard r gulat r r quir m nt and o r ight i hook d to attitud 
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Charges have been brought when - we might say 
even when - the animal is a mouse. 
respect or even sympathy, some respect at least, some sympathy at 
least, which one cannot have at all for something viewed as mere 
tissue or a mobile metabolism. 
I realize there is a contention in this, and that someone can 
say that how he or she views a rat or mouse is not anyone else's 
business, and that the only question, the bottom line as it were, is 
what is done or not done. But this is precisely what I would want 
not just to question but to deny. 
Let me illustrate from the regulation of experimentation on 
children. This is a matter of considerable current comment in 
and out of courts because of recent insistence that drugs admin-
istered to children be tested on children. Current child research 
regulations draw the traditional distinction between thera-
peutic research and non-therapeutic research, non-therapeutic 
meaning that the individual research subject does not receive a 
benefit from it - the general situation in animal research. For 
such non-therapeutic research on children, increasing levels of 
risk, or what we here would call ethical cost, are spelled out 
- minimal risk, a minor increase over minimal risk, more than 
a minor increase over minimal risk - and cost-benefit analysis 
is specified. But subjecting a child to a considerable risk, a "more 
than minor increase over minimal risk" that has no upper limit, is 
not ruled out if the general gain is large enough. Instead, there are 
increasing procedural protections, layers of approval, leading up 
to decision by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
We ask in animal research whether there is any substantive 
limit on what can be done to an animal by chemical or physical 
intervention or by genetic manipulation to produce a condition, 
if the hope for human benefit is great enough. The same general 
question can be asked in research on children: Are there things 
that you just do not do? In the case of children, when the 
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] has finished a period 
of public comment and consultation with a special review board, 
and looks for substantive guidance in making a decision, you will 
see that the standard the regulation provides and the finding the 
secretary must make is this, that the particular research will be 
conducted "in accordance with sound ethical principles." 
This is the regulatory standard for risky research on a non-
consenting human being who receives no benefit from it. If this 
final test is not to be simply empty, and I don't think it was meant 
to be empty, the limit it produces is the limit that arises from 
a live sense of respect and sympathy for the research subject. 
Research conducted with any other attitude toward the child, 
that the child is a physiological mechanism, a mobile metabolism, 
would not pass this final test. 
On the animal side, we might say that there is no such implicit 
limit, that anything can be done if the human benefit is great 
enough, any degree or kind of suffering induced in a present 
creature or a future creature genetically altered. "Ethical" means 
weighing cost and benefit and nothing more than that. 
But consider the three R's, reduction, refinement, and replace-
ment, and whether the requirement of something other than a 
cold or wholly objectified view of an animal research subject is 
not really built into them. If there were no acute sense of ethical 
cost, of tension that cannot be escaped, reduction, refinement, 
and replacement would make no sense. There would be no real 
motivation to achieve them. 
Consider also that there is something substantive, not just 
procedural, in the universal requirement that the investigator be 
a "qualified investigator." A chemist's attitude or conception of the 
materials with which he works may not go to his qualifications -
he may have a lively and romantic vision of the chemical world or 
a bleak and sad one, or one that has no affect to it at all. But where 
the materials being worked with are animals, an investigator's 
conception of an animal as a living and feeling being may go to his 
qualifications. This is no new observation; research administra-
tors I know, who are as solicitous for research as any, are sensitive 
to this connection between attitude and qualifications, and it is 
implicit I think in standard training programs. 
One of the very great pioneers in physiology, Claude Bernard 
in France, is 'Nell known for his attitude toward the living subjects 
of his experimental \vork. "Life," he said, "is nothing but a word 
that means ignorance," and he wrote of the ideal physiologist: 
"He is a man of science, absorbed by the scientific idea which 
he pursues. He no longer hears the cry of animals, he no longer 
sees the blood that flows, he sees only his idea and perceives 
only organisms concealing problems which he intends to solve." 
Historically this was just at the beginning of the modern Western 
controversy over the actual treatment of living things in the 
pursuit of knowledge and general good, and we can certainly ask, 
now a century later, whether for all his genius and all the good 
he did, this great figure would be qualified today to engage in 
research even on rats and mice. 
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